Growing Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean:
Prospects and Challenges
Khalid Manzoor Butt* and Sadaf Jan Siddiqui**
Abstract
The ‘String of Pearls’ strategy attributed to China for growing its relationswith the states situated around the Indian Ocean (IO) in order to neutraliseIndian influence. Furthermore, protecting economic and strategic interestsare also the key factors that China is maintaining its presence in the IndianOcean Region (IOR). After the completion of the China Pakistan EconomicCorridor (CPEC), it is predicted that Gwadar Port will be the mostprecious pearl of the string. With the increased Chinese influence, theUnited States (US) will not fall behind and will have to revise strategy tomaintain its supremacy in the IO and keep Chinese influence under check.However, Chinese presence will enhance economic prospects in the IO butmay also pose some challenges for regional peace and security. In thispaper, an analytical study would be undertaken on such questions.
Keywords: Indian Ocean, Sino-US Relations, China, US, PLA Navy,
String of Pearls.
Introduction
Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean
and position in this region. In the normal course of nation-building effort,the PRC’s venture into this economic theatre is quite understandable. Theconcern, however, that caused India to be worried about China’s IndianOcean aims is about the means and methods that China has adopted inmaterialising its ‘presence’ in the expanse of Asiatic lifeline. China sees theIOR as its domain of strategic importance in which her economicrelationships, based on military and economic power projection.Accordingly, the Indian Ocean (IO) is a top priority in China’s political andeconomic road map towards its achievement as a global power status. In thisprocess, a competition with other stakeholders of the IO like; the US,Britain, India, Australia, France and Japan has started.2 Of course, thesepowers will not like to give a free hand to China to flex its muscles and suchconfrontation would not be conducive for regional peace, coherence and formaintaining the balance of power. India’s geographical position in the IORis an obstacle for the strategic objectives of China. Meanwhile, China hasfeatured the IO as it is strategically ‘beat’ which combined with its plannedmilitary bases around the Indian peninsula and would disturb traditionalneighborhoods of India. This paper is a description of the PRC’s conceivedand adopted strategies to materialise her renewed ‘position’ in the IO.
It is a descriptive research based on analytical approach. The datacollection for the research is based on secondary resources. Various books,articles and websites were consulted to gather relevant information. Viewsand statements given by the social scientists and leaders in this region areincluded to critically analyse the situation.
Mackinder’s Heartland Theory and the Indian Ocean Region
The ‘Heartland’ theory put forward by Halford Mackinder and he putemphasis on the ‘pivot area.’ He described, the increased attention was putthrough the concept of geopolitics. In addition, Mackinder’s conceptsrevolving around geopolitics and sea power (significance of navy) areopposite the idea put forward by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mackinder’s theoryassumed the incorporation of a huge empire into existence at the Heartland.This Heartland would be independent of the coastal areas andintercontinental transportation and will not need to use the seas for keeping
2 Suhasini Haidar, “Quad-The Confluence of Four Powers and Two Seas,” Hindu, July 25, 2020.
herself intact. Mackinder considered the geography of Earth divided into thecore (world island consisting of Eurasia and Africa) and border (America,British Isles, and Oceana). The border or periphery was much smaller thanthe core and would rely mostly on sea transport to cope with thetechnological level of the core. The core would be in control of sufficientnatural resources in contrast to the periphery which would have a broadlydivided industrial base. The Heartland could use its navy to destroy each ofthem in turn and establish its own industries further than the reach of theperiphery thus gave it the much-needed strategic advantage. The Coreaddressed by Mackinder as the Heartland because it was at the center of theworld. Moreover, he also gave credit to the tactical advantage provided bythe coastal areas and oceanic regions.3
The IO geopolitics holds great significance among China, the US, andIndia in the 21st century. This significance is attributed because the rim-landas described by Mackinder consists of states sharing shore by the sea (alsodescribed as Upland or Tributary region). India and South Africa began anIndian Ocean rim initiative which was later on joined by Australia andMauritius. Subsequently, it lured other littorals states and the initiative wasjoined by Malaysia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Yemen andIndonesia. Keeping the rim-land initiative in mind, one can say thatNicholas John Spykman’s assumption becomes quite relevant to thecontemporary world, as whoever controls the Indian Ocean subsequentlycontrols the world. The ‘geographic’ world refers the land, sea, air, spaceand most possibly cyberspace and it cannot be avoided. Today’s strategicsignificance of the IO is the same as four decades back in history. WhenGreat Britain withdrew its forces from the Suez Canal, the biggest concernwas the power-vacuum and who would fill it. This fact draws the IO backinto the spotlight as the impact of geopolitical scenario is observed on bothintentional behaviours and military co-operations among different states. “When the transition of power occurred from the Great Britain in the late60s, no one was in doubt of who will be filling the gap, the only questionthen was how the United States (US) was planning to organise and controlthe Indian Ocean.”4 It was a quick and smooth change of guard at the IObetween the two Anglo-Saxon powers. This swift shift of burden also put a
3 Mackinder, H. J. “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal, vol. 23, no. 4 ( 1904):421-37, https://. doi.org/10.2307/1775498
4 Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy inthe Cold War and After, Second Edition, (JHU press, 1995).
quick end to the debate about the Indian Ocean and its strategic future.Furthermore, “The geopolitical arena will be reconfigured as China andIndia move towards intensifying their economic growth thus producing agravitational pull that will transform the shape of Asia Pacific, Indian Oceanand the littoral. The result would be a reformed state of relations betweenboth major world powers and their regional allies. This shift will transforminto a ‘strategic triangle’ both in the Maritimes and littoral world betweenIndia, China, and the US.”5
Growing Presence of China in Indian Ocean
India has stakes and been exerting its influence among the island states inthe IO as a big economy and military power in the region. Therefore, Indiaalways looks upon the IO as its domain of influence.6 This is the reason thatsoon after taking office, the then newly elected Prime Minister of India,Narendra Modi in May 2014 announced that his first and foremost taskwould be to extend and enhance its bilateral trade relations with theneighbouring states of India. This was a time when China, too, wasgradually overshadowing India in the region, by extending its owneconomic growth, and Modi was well aware of the danger India would faceas a consequence of being overshadowed by its immediate regionaleconomic rival.7 What worried Modi was that China’s One Belt One Road(OBOR) project through which China was extending its influence bybuilding in-roads into South Asia? These in-roads shifted the inclination inrelationships of its neighbour states from India to China and deepened herrelations with the states that were already on friendly terms and ultimatelythis is not only putting India at risk of lagging behind China but also wouldmake it relatively less important in South Asia.
To add to it, China also has an established military base in Djibouti andis in talks with Myanmar for managing the Kyaukphyu port. Moreover,
5 Dilip Das, “Regionalism In A Globalising World: An Asia-Pacific Perspective,”CSGR Working Paper No. 80/01, 2001, Centre for the Study of Globalisation andRegionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom,http://www.csgr.org
6 Priyanjoli Ghosh, “India’s Indian Ocean Region Strategy,” Journal of Indo-PacificAffairs, Air University Press, August 31, 2020.
7 Sreeram Chaulia, Modi Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of India’s Prime Minister, (Bloomsbury Publishing : September 14, 2016, 1st Edition )
“China has persuaded the Thai authorities to re-consider the idea of buildinga canal at the Kra-Isthmus which would put the significance of Strait ofMalacca at risk by allowing ships to pass from the Bay of Bengal to theSouth China Sea without having to pass through the Malacca.”8
For much of its history, China’s focus was on South East Asia but since2014, a steady shift has been observed in her policy towards the SouthAsian region. South Asia ─ home to one fourth of the global population andthe world’s third largest economic region in terms of Purchasing PowerParity (PPP).9 This all combined produces a lucrative and more profitablemarket with a diverse base for Chinese products. Due to political conditionsand infrastructural challenges, accessing the Indian markets directly throughArunachal Pradesh, Afghanistan or Pakistan — the only way left for Chinato access the Indian markets is via Bangladesh due to the friendly relationsthese two states maintain. The Chinese plan in Bangladesh through its checkbook diplomacy10 initiating massive infrastructural development projects.Given the central location of Bangladesh in the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) which holds a strategically important Chittagong portalong with the contemporary Maritime Silk Road is a very important factorin the realisation of both economic and maritime Belt and Road Initiatives(BRI). If the Chinese succeed in passing their naval ships through the Bayof Bengal, India could find itself struggling on three fronts at the same timeagainst Chinese forces. This would include the Arunachal Pradesh, India’sNortheast, the Bay of Bengal at its east and Pakistan at its west which areboth China’s ally at the same time. The Chinese government is usingpolitical and military tactics combined with expanding economic assistanceto the countries in South Asian region for having strong footholds. Chinaundertaking all these steps in the region, meanwhile India is unable to matchher naval, strategic or economic power to China. Table no. 1 shows theprocurement of Chinese vessels by the South Asian naval powers inextraordinary numbers, most of the time, a result of joint Research andDevelopment for developing new combat vessels and submarines. In
8 A. Morsy, “The Impact of “The Belt Road Initiative,”, Egypt Economy andForeign Policy, 2019
9 Lee Jong-Wha, “Is the Asian Century Really Here?” Project Syndicate, April 01,
2021. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asian-century-requires-unified-regional-leadership-by-lee-jong-wha-2021-04
10 Check book diplomacy is used to describe a foreign policy which openly useseconomic aid and investment between countries to carry diplomatic favor.
68
Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean
addition, these countries are heavily relying on China in terms of Maritimescommercial operations due to her heavy investments in deep seaports andother related infrastructural projects.
India has somehow succeeded in attaining its strategic alliance withMaldives, though it is a tiny state, yet it will give India a little edge overChina as China’s most energy imports travel from the Middle East andAfrica and pass by near Maldives. In case of any conflict between thetwo countries, China would be disadvantaged from this point as India’sbase at the Andaman Islands could interrupt the transportation ofChinese ships via Strait of Malacca along with to disrupt Pakistanimaritime activities at the same time in the Arabian Sea by using its navalpower. It is understood that such developments have made the IOstrategically more important regionally as well as globally. With thepassage of time, as the size of economies of the South Asian countriesand China further grow, the IO will have more vitality.
China’s Power Projection in Indian Ocean
The massive volume of trade has compelled China to secure strategicposition in the IO for protection of her interests. China’s growing economicstature at global level necessitates its power projection in IO. Chinesemaritime aims also call for a worldwide ‘PLAN.’ “The father of thecontemporary Chinese navy, Liu Huaqing, projected People’s LiberationArmy Navy (PLA Navy) to become a global force by 2050.”11 China’saspirations of becoming a maritime power as stated in its White Paper of2013 is in line with this thought process. Chinese analysts also feel necessityof using the PLA Navy for the protection of China’s international ambitionsand interests. Rear Admiral Y. Zhou, a nationalist political adviser stated, “The paramount importance is safeguarding Chinese nationals abroad bytaking care of their political, economic and occupational safety. He notesthat safeguarding them would ensure steady development on the domesticlevel. Thus, to do this, China needs naval power and advanced technologicalinfrastructures like aircraft carriers.”12
China gained support from certain states of the IOR, particularly in EastAfrica; and its financial investments grew there, as some of them werepolitically unstable and had difficulties for the foreign business as well.According to Director of the College of African Studies atZhejiang Traditional University, Liu Hongwu, “The key aspects in thefuture development of cooperation between the African Union and Chinesegovernment are security and co-operation. Now, for the last few years,many African states are asking the Chinese government to develop andupdate their security protocols.”13
China has also entered into strategic partnerships with a number ofcountries like South Africa, Egypt, Pakistan and the ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) which intended for shaping an
11 Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon and Cortez A. Cooper, “ China’s AircraftCarrier Program: Drivers, Developments, Implications,” Naval War CollegeReview, vol. 68, no. 4 (2015): 64-79, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26397884.12 William A. Callahan and EBSCO host, China Dreams: 20 Visions of TheFuture(Oxford University Press Oxford 2013).
13 Chris Alden, “China’s and Africa’s Natural Resources: The Challenges andImplications for Development and Governance,” Africa Portal, 2009,https://www.africaportal.org/publications/china-and-africas-natural-resources-the-challenges-and-implications-for-development-and-governance/
international order competitive with its long-term interests. The ongoingmodernisation of the Chinese armed forces is also aimed at emerging alimited power projection competence to “develop strategic data based ona favourable and emphasised employment of the military forces.”14Furthermore, it can be noted that Chinese power projection in the regionthrough diplomatic and military initiatives coupled with an outreach tovarious countries, amidst ever-increasing economic engagement willremain a basis of its foreign policy as China graduates to big powerstatus.15
Implications of Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean
One should not forget that ever since the Cold War, the US had supremacyover the Indian Ocean and was playing a monitoring role to oversee thetrade routes. It seems obvious that the US would not compromise the roleand position that could be challenged by the growing Chinese influence.Thesignificance of the IO will draw special attention from the US strategistsbecause of its pivotal location and being a trade hub of global trade andenergy supplies.
Due to the importance of the IO, certain world powers also have theirnaval presence in the IOR. Such can be seen in the case of the US where inaddition to its forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, “it’s 5th Fleet is in Bahrain andregularly using the Diego Garcia Island as its naval and air-based operationsin addition to providing logistical support to its operations in the IOR. TheUS Task Force 152 is also having a significant presence in the area taskedfor ensuring the safe and secure flow of energy resources through thePersian Gulf. In addition, Task Force 150 is assigned for combating piracythroughout the Gulf of Oman and Kenya. The US also maintains asignificant presence throughout the Indian Ocean and has an establishedmilitary base in Djibouti which is the largest base of such significance on
14 Stephen Hoadley and Jian Yang, “China’s Cross-Regional FTA Initiatives:Towards Comprehensive National Power,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 80, no.2 (2007):327-348.
15 Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, “Building a More “Democratic” and“Multipolar” World: China’s Strategic Engagement with Developing Countries,”The China Review, vol. 19, no. 4 (November 2019): 55-84.
he whole of the African Continent.”16 The purpose of the Djibouti base isto ensure safe passages through Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez Canal which isknown as the world’s busiest shipping routes. “A major function of this baseis to counter the Somali piracy which is attracted to the region due to thefrequency of passing ships and size of cargo passing through. In recentyears, given its significant location due to Somalia in South and Yemenlying approximately 30 km from the strait, China has also startedestablishing a base in the region.”17
In the case of Europe, however, France is the only country that has aconsiderable presence in the IOR quadrants facing the south west and north,maintaining bases in Abu Dhabi and Djibouti. Recently, the US hasdeclared an infrastructural development fund of 113 million dollars fordevelopment in digital economies, energy, and infrastructural projects tocounter the increased Chinese presence in the region as the Chinese arerapidly investing in Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi and Pakistan ports and Africandevelopmental projects.
The IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) which aims to developconsiderable economic growth, security and liberal trade practices have 21border member states along with Australia. “The white paper, published inthe 2017 edition of Australian Foreign Policy, registers its maritime aims assuch, to support and assist the IORA in pertaining to International law andmaritime trade and security.”18 The security of maritime trade routes holdsvital importance to Australia’s economic wellbeing and energy supplies tothe region. Of more importance to Australia in the South East Asianstrategic depth for her security that is provided by the FPDA (Five PowerDefense Agreement). Initially, this alliance was formed by Singapore,Malaysia, the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand and Australia whichprovided security assurance to the Australia’s proneness to extremist attackscarried out in the aspect of its western perspective propagated globally. Dueto the FPDA, any attack on any of the five states would obligate other states
16 Lord Jopling, “Maritime Security: Nato and EU Roles and Co-ordination,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2010.
17 Theo Notteboom, “Towards a New Intermediate Hub Region in ContainerShipping? Relay and Interlining Via Cape Route vs The Suiz Route,” The Journal ofTransport Geography (2012): 164-178.
18 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “China’s Maritime-Strategic Presence in IOR: Geopolitical,Geo economic and Security Import,” Maritime Affairs: The Journal of The NationalMaritimes Foundation of India, 1-15, 2014.
to consult and carry out a single or distributed response towards tackling theimmediate threat. Because of Australia’s western character, “it is susceptibleto attacks and maritime security both on naval and trade grounds holdpivotal significance for combating non-state sea bound threats in the IORand Southeast Asia.”19
Notwithstanding “After the Chinese government established a navalbase in Sanya at the Southern edge of Hainan, it deployed its Jin submarinesin the Indian Ocean in 2008. This base is just 1200 nautical miles from theMalacca Strait and holds the closest accessibility route to the Indian Ocean.This move raised eyebrows of Indian leaders, as it is the closest access routefor India towards the Indian Ocean. The Sanya base holds an undergroundfacility that serves the function of hiding the movement of the Jins andmakes it difficult to be detected.”20 These tunnels and underground facilitiesat the tip of deep-water worry India as this facility can have strategicimplications for her in the IOR. “This facility serves as a chokepoint for theBab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz and Malacca straits and facilitates the ‘String ofPearls’ strategy that China is gradually adapting to increase its strategicimpact on the region and also is a strategic threat to India.”21
String of Pearls Strategy
This term was used by the American and Indian defense and strategicanalysts to refer to the major plan of China to surround India by establishingseaports and airports in countries situated around India. The term ‘String ofPearls’ was first used in 2005, “in a report entitled ‘Energy Futures in Asia’provided to the US Defence Secretary Donald H Rumsfeld by defencecontractor Booz Allen Hamilton.22 It alleged that China was following thestrategy of ‘string of pearls’ making bases from the Middle East to theSouthern China. These ‘pearls’ were naval bases or electronic spying posts
19 Chris Rahman, “The Rise Of China As A Regional Maritime Power: StrategicImplications For A New Century,” University Of Wollongong Thesis Collection1954-2016, 2003.
20 Harsh V Pant, “Rising China In India’s Vicinity: A Rivalry Takes Shape In Asia,”Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2016): 364-381.
21 Mari Izuyama, Masahiro Kurita, “Security in the Indian Ocean Region: RegionalResponses to China’s Growing Influence,” Chapter 2, East Asian Strategic Review2017, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan.
22 Zhou Bo, “The String of Pearls and the Maritime Silk Road,” China Daily, February 12, 2014.
built by the Chinese in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Thebasic purpose was to protect its overseas power and protect its tradeshipments.”23
The Gwadar deep seaport in Balochistan (Pakistan) also serves as animportant component of the Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ strategy. Apart fromthis, “the Chinese base in Burma and Chinese intelligence activities andestablished facilities at the Bay of Bengal, the Kra Isthmus proposal towardsthe Thai authorities and military pacts with the Cambodian authorities havehelped China to build substantial presence throughout the South China seaand IOR.”24 China’s 80 per cent of fuel passes through the Malacca Strait
23 D. G., Dwivedi, “Indian Ocean Region (IOR) : India as a Net Security Provider-The Way Ahead, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/indian-ocean-region-ior-india-as-a-net-security-provider-the-way-ahead/
24 Chandana Priyantha Arangalla, “Nonalignment To Balance China’ss InflueanceOn Sri Lanka: Negotiating Chinas String Of Pearl Strategy For The Pearl Of TheIndian Ocean,” Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, 2017.
and she is not likely to rely on the US naval power for its security becauseof strained relations between the two. China, therefore, is establishing itsown naval bases at eastern choke points along the South China Sea andPersian Gulf region for self-reliance. Apart from the naval bases, China isalso establishing container ports at Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and Chittagong(Bangladesh) to consolidate its position at the IOR. China has alreadyagreed with the Sri Lankan government to establish and finance theHambantota Development Zone and build a bunker system, oil refinery andcontainer ports.
“The Gwadar Port at the Southwest of Pakistan has generated lots ofcuriosity due to its strategic location lying around 70 km from Iran and 400kilometers east to the Hormuz which is a vital energy resource supply routeto the world. The Gwadar deep seaport will provide the Chinese with a‘attending post’ which can use to keep an eye on the American and Indian
ughout the world without involving in alliance ormilitary coalitions. According to Chinese government statements, “Thestrategy of ‘mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity’ is acenterpiece of Chinese strategy, as stated in numerous PRC White Paperson National Defense.”26 It is debatable whether China is pursuinghegemonic interests through’ String of Pearls’ strategy, or simplyfollowing the policy for economic growth and peacefully rising to theglobal stage as a major actor. Whatsoever is the reason, Hence Indiaperceives that China is encircling her for strategic advantages.
Interests of Other Stakeholders in Indian Ocean
The IOR has huge economic and strategic value even to the European statesdespite the distance. Most of the European trade routes from Asia passthrough IOR. “The IOR also provides the only gateway to Europe towardsSoutheast Asian and Asia-Pacific markets. Europe maintains almost 35 percent of its exports to Asia and has 4 out of its 10 major trade partners in theIOR.27” It goes without saying that “The IOR’s chokepoints at the Strait ofHormuz and Malacca have most of Europe’s energy supply passing throughit on a daily basis. An almost 34m barrel of oil is carried through thesechokepoints every day.”28 Therefore, it is heavily dependent on smoothSLOC (Sea Lines of Communication) and swift passage throughout theirtrade routes.
25 Sajid Shahzad, “Maritime Affairs in Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone in Indian Ocean,” University Of Punjab, Lahore, 2017,
http://173.208.131.244:9060/xmlui/handle/123456789/6041
26 Anthony Cordesman, Steve Colley and Micheal Wang, “Chinese Strategy AndMilitary Modernization In 2015: A Comparative Analysis,” Center for Strategic &International Studies, Rowman & Little Field, 2016.
27 Thomas Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating A Monster? The Rise Of ChinaAnd US Policy Toward East Asia,” International Security, 31(1), 81-126, 2006.28 Geoffrey Till, Sea Power: A Guide For The 21st Century, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).
Similarly, for the United Kingdom (UK) importance of stability in IORas its maritime interests align with the smooth transportation of its cargofrom South Asia, the Middle East, China and Africa. After the Brexit, it is afact that “UK adopted austerity measures among its public departments, itspresence on diplomatic fronts have decreased globally. There is a smoothreorientation towards streamlining its economic interests to become aneconomic powerhouse in the EU.”29 These policies are directed towardsmany IOR economies including Malaysia, Singapore, India, and Indonesia.These markets are targeted, as high growth rate environments for Britain’sproducts. Even after, it is no longer an Empire; the UK still has stakes in theIOR.
Japan, Australia and other stakeholders are also perturbed about theChinese rising investments in the region. These economies have proposed toestablish a global order based on a set of pre-defined rules in the Indo-Pacific regions to counter the growing Chinese presence particularly atimportant strategic chokepoints. Most IOR countries have their own naviesin the Indian Ocean which are now coupled with naval alliances with China,the US and the European States. Similarly, Japan, the US and Australia seeBeijing’s acquisition of lands along the shores of IOR as a threat to theirinterests and are worried that with the passage of time, China will adopt arelatively stronger approach towards the IOR by undercutting thecollaborative practices and norms established in the Indo-Pacific water.
The US defence department has strategic interest in safeguarding andstreamlining the SLOCs for their energy imports and protecting traderoutes from any adventure or interference by maintaining a strong navalpresence in the Indian Ocean. Since the Cold War, the US hasestablished this order in the IOR and is still doing so by havingestablished military bases in Diego Garcia and the Persian Gulf. At thesame time, Japan holds its own economic interests in the Southeast Asianregion, serves as a lifeline for her energy supplies. Despite having navalforces, Japan is unable to secure the naval routes due to the limitsimposed by its own constitution. Therefore, it seems obvious that, Japanwould re-visit her security options in order to protect its strategic andeconomic interests in the South China Sea and the IOR.
29 Richard Pomfret, “Regionalism In East Asia: Why Has It Flourish Since 2000And How Far It Will Go?,” Asia Pacific Economic Literature, vol. 25, issue no.2(2011).
For the time being, European states have been observing the rapiddevelopments in the IOR from the sidelines. However, in case of securitythreat or instability in the region, Europe’s trade and energy supplieswould be at risk. Any instability in the region will have far-reachingimplications on Europe’s economic and strategic security. The EUmember states have been discussing a single principle-based order in theIOR to protect their interests in the Indian Ocean. The EU can achievethese goals by engaging with the IOR countries on diplomatic channelsand draw a mechanism by using presence of French naval fleets in theregion.
Russia as part of its ‘Pivot to the East’ strategy, she is developingstronger diversified ties with regional players in the IOR. “The RussianMoD on October 16, 2018 announced Friendship 2018 which were jointmilitary exercises carried out in the Northern region of Pakistaninvolving more than 200 troops from both countries signifying towards anew step towards bilateral relations between the two countries.”30 Theyare now exacerbated by the emergence of new means of communicationand/or attacks linked to the technological revolution, for example,artificial intelligence and robotics technologies. Ensuring digital securityin the IO is no less important now, with regional states increasinglysusceptible to cyber-attacks. In this context, the need for security andsafety of deep-water cables are also worth mentioning.31
Cooperation or Confrontation in the IOR
China’s BRI has attracted great media attention and generated heateddiscussions globally since it announced. It is a combination of hugeinfrastructural development projects and steps towards the reduction ofnon-tariff barriers establishment of trade connections in Asian, Africanand Eurasian regions. These projects will increase connectivity andcommerce activity by establishing new land and sea lines, connectingChina with other regions of the world. The BRI is split into 2 parts: therevival of the historic Silk route on land and the revitalisation of theMaritime Silk route to cover around 60 countries that are currently
30Chuanlu Feng, “An Analysis On The Geopolitical Pattern And Regional Situation In South Asia,” Springer, Singapore, 2018.
31 Miles Brundage et al., The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting,Prevention, and Mitigation (Oxford University Press, February, 2018).
generating a total of 55 per cent of the world’s Gross National Product.The BRI will encompass around 70 per cent of the world population andwill provide a transport route for more than 75 per cent of the discoverednatural energy reserves.
The seaborne BRI focuses on developing relatively short and smoothroutes by constructing a chain of deep seaports and controlling vitalchokepoints along the Maritime route to the economic andmanufacturing hubs in China. It includes not only port projects, but alsocross-land connections such as railway and pipeline constructions. Asenormous as the projects in BRI are, the obstacles, costs, potentialenergy and rewards are all huge. Therefore, the plan of BRI will bringgreat opportunity for international trading companies and logisticsservice providers to expand their business and for the countries involved,to develop their economies.32 To achieve these goals, it is important tofirst understand the current trading situation and transportation networkand foresee the changes that the projects will bring.
As an emerging power, China needs oil and for that matter, she hasto import it from energy rich IOR and Caspian Region. “China has notbeen involved in an offensive strike for the last two centuries. AlthoughChina has influence over a vital economic and military route, theWakhan Corridor, it has not yet been used or provided for thedeployment of the western forces for combat in Afghanistan. TheWakhan Corridor serves as a trade route between the Indian OceanRegion and the Caspian Sea. China wants to secure its economic routespassing through Afghanistan and even Pakistan leading to much wantedGwadar Port at the choke point energy-rich Hurmoz in IOR.”33 Thepresence of the US in Afghanistan is making China compromised;however, analysts and economists are of the view that “China is anemerging economic power and can wait for the right moment. Each actorin international arena acts to its own interests an every regional andglobal power knows that peace in Afghanistan is vital for stability inregion. As per China, the point of concern is not only the US but also the
32 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative” Council on Foreign Relations, Updated, January 28, 2020.
33 HasanYaser Malik, “The Emerging Strategic Rivalries In Indian Ocean Region:An Analysis Of Indo- Ameican Ambitions And Implications For China,” Journal ofContemporary Studies, vol. III, no.2 (Winter 2014).
aspirant India that is eager to occupy the gap in power vacuum at the IOR created by ouster of the US forces.”34
Conclusion
This paper mainly focuses on the analysis and the implications ofregional and extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean. The IOR’sstrategic location and importance compel every stakeholder to securemaximum advantages for its national economic and strategic interests.The US along with other countries aspires to utilise the SLOCs forsmoother trade conduction. Therefore, India and the US also holdreservations over the growing presence and influence of China in theIOR. India seems that in future, perhaps compromise on sharing itspower and writ on the IOR with China for its own economic interests.Pakistan, shares border with some of the key regional players in the IORbut have little implications when it comes to the IOR. For China, peaceand stability would be the first priority in the IOR for ensuring smooth,swift and safe trade and the US would play its part in promoting regionalpeace and stability instead of pursuing domination in the IOR for its owngains which can undermine international trade and stability.
The US wishes to keep its ‘traditional role’ for its supremacy and tomonitor the Indian Ocean for the protection of its political interest whichis already under threat in the Asian countries like Afghanistan, Iraq andIran. Therefore, to deal with such challenges, the US needs to keep itssupremacy and grip in the Indian Ocean.
China traditionally is known, as a non-expansionist state does not seemto have political supremacy in the IO thus will avoid involving herself ininternational conflicts. However, she will prefer smooth trade and growingeconomy instead of involving herself in conflict with the US and otherWestern powers because that may undermine its BRI plan. It is likely thatChina would find a peaceful and moderate way and will create a win-winsituation for major stakeholders with her soft diplomacy. It is presumed thatChina would manage to keep major stakeholders quiet and use the String ofPearls strategy to secure the economic benefits of the region rather would go
34 S.K. Chakrabarty, “Aspects of Modern International Relation,” Mittal Publications, 1995.
80
Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean
for any naval supremacy and hegemony in the Indian Ocean. In case, Chinais unable to manage this then its BRI multibillion-dollar plan for economicgains will be compromised.
